What is the most important recent development in the Japan-China confrontation over the barren East China Sea islets called the Senkakus by Japan and the Diaoyu by China? It could be the June 11 announcement by China's Huawei Technologies that it will increase the share of Japanese parts in its smartphones to 70% from 50% to help it challenge Samsung and Apple. This is particularly interesting since many Western intelligence agencies believe that Huawei is closely tied to China's People's Liberation Army.

日本和中国围绕东海几个荒芜的小岛（日方称为尖阁列岛、中方称为钓鱼岛）发生的冲突，这段时间最为重要的变动是什么？可能是中国的华为技术有限公司(Huawei Technologies)在6月11日宣布，将把华为智能手机的日本零部件比例从50%提高到70%，以助力华为挑战三星(Samsung)和苹果(Apple)。考虑到很多西方情报机关都认为华为跟中国人民解放军有着千丝万缕的联系，这件事情别有一番意味。

Huawei's move underscores that the struggle over these islets is not just a dangerous contest between Japan and China, complete with armed vessels in close contact and the risk of an unintended clash. It is also a contest within each country over which force will dominate policy: nationalist passion or economic dependence.

从华为此举可以看到，围绕这些小岛产生的纠纷不只是日本和中国之间的一场危险竞赛，有武装船只的近距离接触，有擦枪走火的风险；它也是两国内部将由哪种力量──民族主义情绪还是经济依赖性──主导政策的竞赛。

Just as Japan depends on China as a market, so China needs Japan for many of the parts embedded in its own exports. Boycotting Japanese products would hamstring the export-fueled growth that underpins Communist Party rule.

日本依靠中国的市场，而中国出口的产品当中，很多零部件也需要日本提供。抵制日货会阻碍支撑着中共统治的出口推动型经济的增长。

Despite this interdependence, when the Japanese government announced its intention to buy some of the islets from their private Japanese owner last July, riots and boycotts broke out all over China. Some were encouraged by the government. China's Commerce Ministry hinted at the possibility of a prolonged boycott. Car sales temporarily plunged by almost half.

虽然有这样的相互依赖，但当日本政府在去年7月份宣布打算从日籍私人岛主手中买下一部分小岛时，中国各地都出现了暴乱和抵制活动。部分活动受到政府的鼓励。中国商务部暗示了长期抵制的可能性。日本汽车销量一度重挫，下降幅度接近一半。

Although China first claimed the islets in 1971─Japan has controlled them since 1895─Beijing did not pursue its claim until recent years. On the contrary, in the interests of improving economic and political ties, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka agreed in 1972 to 'shelve' the issue indefinitely. However, since communism has weakened as a legitimizing ideology for the regime, Beijing has increasingly relied on nationalism. This nationalism is one of several factors in China's current abrasive pursuit of territorial claims throughout the East and South China Seas.

这些岛屿从1895年以来一直受日本控制。虽然中国首次提出领土主张是在1971年，但北京方面直到最近几年才推行这一主张。而在1972年，为了改善双方经济关系和政治关系，中国总理周恩来与日本首相田中角荣(Kakuei Tanaka)一致决定无限期“搁置”这个问题。但由于共产主义作为赋予政权合法性的意识形态角色减弱，北京已经越来越多地依赖于民族主义。当前中国强硬推行东海及南海的领土主张，民族主义便是这背后的多种因素之一。

And yet economic interdependence has compelled both Beijing and Tokyo to rein in their nationalistic urges. Japan's dependence on China is well known. For more than a decade, the ups and downs of the Japanese economy have inordinately hinged on the ups and downs of exports. China stands at the center of this export-dependence. From 1995 to 2011, increased shipments to China accounted for 45% of the overall growth in Japanese exports. From July 2012 through April of this year, however, Japan's price-adjusted exports to China fell by 11%, compared to a 5% drop in its global exports.

但经济上的相互依赖迫使北京和东京都要遏制住各自的民族主义冲动。日本对中国的依赖为人们熟知。十几年来，日本经济的起伏极大地系于出口的起伏，而中国处在这种出口依赖性的中心位置。从1995年到2011年，对华出口增量占日本出口总增量的45%。但从2012年7月到今年4月份，日本经价格因素调整后的对华出口量下降了11%，相比之下其全球出口总量的下降幅度是5%。

This dependence helps explain why Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has held back from hawkish actions he touted during last December's election campaign, such as putting personnel and facilities on the islets. Japanese business has been urging him to refrain from any provocations while simultaneously maintaining Japan's sovereignty over the islets.

这种依赖性部分解释了为什么日本首相安倍晋三(Shinzo Abe)并没有像他在去年12月份竞选期间宣扬的那样采取强硬行动，比如在岛上安置人员和设施之类。日本商界一直呼吁他不要采取任何挑衅行为，同时又要维护日本对于这些岛屿的主权。

What is less well known, even by many Chinese, is how much China needs Japan. For years, Japan has been China's single largest source of imports, and around 60 70% of these are the machinery and parts needed to make China's own products. A 2012 International Monetary Fund report calculated that for every percentage point of growth in China's global exports, its imports from Japan rise by 1.2 percentage points. Take away those imports, and China's exports collapse.

而中国对日本的依赖程度则是人们相对不太了解的，甚至很多中国人都不太了解。日本一直是中国最大的进口来源国，这些进口产品当中，大约六七成都是中国制造自己的产品所需要的机器和零部件。国际货币基金组织(International Monetary Fund)2012年的一篇报告通过计算得出，中国全球出口每增长一个百分点，从日本的进口就增长1.2个百分点。刨除这些进口，中国的出口就会崩溃。

Consider the iPhone and the iPad. Although Apple hires Taiwan's Foxconn to assemble these products in China, they contain Japanese parts like Toshiba 6502.TO +1.51% flash memory drives and Sharp LCD screens. The case of Apple is instructive for two reasons. First, as China has increasingly begun to export high-tech products, it has needed to rely more and more on imported parts. Half of the sales value of information and communications equipment consists of imported content. And these import-intensive machinery and electronics products have risen from just 22% of all Chinese exports in 1992 to 63% in 2006, and presumably even more today.

想想iPhone和iPad。虽然苹果请了中国台湾的富士康(Foxconn)在中国大陆组装这两款产品，但它们包含了东芝(Toshiba)的闪存、夏普(Sharp)的LCD屏幕等日本零部件。苹果这个案例很有启发性，原因有二：第一，在中国逐渐开始出口高科技产品的过程中，它对进口零部件的依赖越来越强。信息与通讯设备的销售价格里面，一半的部分都由进口内容构成。这些进口密集型机械电子产品在1992年只占中国全部出口额的22%，到2006年则已升至63%，今天想必还要更多。

Second, China's modernization depends on a host of multinational corporations using China as their workshop. In 2010, foreign companies and joint foreign-Chinese ventures accounted for more than 25% of China's entire industrial output, 39% of its apparel exports, and 99% of its computer exports. China cannot single out Japanese products without damaging and alienating the entire network of multinational companies that fuel China's march up the value chain and toward higher living standards. These multinationals can move elsewhere if Beijing makes life too difficult.

第二，中国的现代化有赖于大量跨国公司将中国当成它们的车间。2010年，外资和中外合资企业占中国工业总产值的25%以上，占服装出口额的39%，占计算机出口额的99%。中国如果给予日货特殊照顾，则不可能不损害、疏远整个跨国公司网络，正是这个网络推动中国迈向价值链的更高端、达到更高的生活水平。如果中国政府让这些跨国公司的日子过得太艰难，它们可能就会迁移到其他地方去。

Chinese leaders have increasingly begun to face that reality. Last fall, an op-ed in the Chinese Communist Party-owned Global Times argued that, 'Blindly boycotting Japanese goods by giving way to sentiments could harm our own industries and exports, and reduce employment.' This year Chinese censors have blocked the words 'Boycott Japan' from Weibo, China's Twitter equivalent, and car sales have now surpassed pre-crisis levels. China's provincial governments, meanwhile, keep imploring Japanese companies to expand their operations in China. The provinces need the jobs and tax revenue.

中国领导人已经逐渐开始直面这一现实。去年中共旗下《环球时报》(Global Times)的一篇署名文章说，盲目抵制日货，必然让我们自己的制造业、出口和就业蒙受重创。今年中国审查者在微博上屏蔽了“抵制日货”，日本汽车销量现在也超过了危机之前的水平。与此同时，中国的省级政府继续吁请日本企业在中国扩张。这些省份需要由此带来的就业和税收。

World War I cruelly demonstrated that economic self-interest does not always override nationalist fervor. But it does raise the cost of letting emotions dominate. Economic self-interest may be what ultimately tips the balance of forces within each country back toward those willing to put territorial claims back on the shelf.

第一次世界大战残酷地证明，经济上的自利不一定能够战胜民族主义的狂热。但它确实提高了放任情绪主导政策的成本。经济自利最终或许会让每一个国家内部的力量天平重新倾向那些愿意重新“搁置”领土主张的人们。