The agencies that regulate financial markets are master craftsmen of detailed rule books. For decades, they have seen this as their main job, and for good reason. Companies prefer clear rules. Legislators want to avoid handing discretionary powers to unelected regulatory agencies. And the public rightly wants to know the standards to which companies are being held.

负责监管金融市场的机构，可以说是制定详尽规则手册的大师。几十年来，他们将此视为自己的主要工作，而且理由充分：企业更喜欢清晰的规则；立法者希望避免将自由裁量权交给非经选举产生的监管机构；而公众理所当然地希望知道企业被要求遵守的标准是怎样的。

But there is an unfortunate flipside. Detailed rule books are the meat and drink of regulatory arbitrage. Finance is a shape-shifting industry. Complex regulations can seem to legitimise the practice of burrowing through the holes they inevitably contain. And rigid rules are of little use when activity moves outside the regulated sector.

但这里存在一个不幸的反面。对监管套利来说，详尽的规则手册堪称命脉。金融是一个业务形态不断变化的行业。复杂的监管规则不可避免地存在漏洞，此类规则有可能反而给钻空子的行为披上合法外衣。而当经营活动拓展到受监管的行业以外时，僵化的规则就毫无用处。

This matters. As banking regulation becomes more stringent once again – with greater constraints on the structure of banks’ balance sheets and on the types of asset they hold – some of the substance of banking will inevitably re-emerge elsewhere. This means that tightening banking regulation is not sufficient to prevent excessive liquidity risk and leverage among

这一点非常重要。随着银行监管再次变得更加严格——银行的资产负债表结构以及所持资产类型受到了更多限制——银行业的一些实质问题将不可避免地在其他地方再度冒头。这意味着收紧银行业监管规则不足以防备所谓“影子银行”体系中的过量流动性风险和高杠杆，这些影子银行的问题正不断发酵，可能酿成未来的又一场危机。这是从美国在2007至2009年金融危机的经历得出的惨痛教训，当时各类影子银行成堆倒闭，将恐慌和痛苦通过全球经贸联系蔓延开来。

so-called “shadow” banks brewing another crisis down the road. That is a strong lesson from the US experience during the 2007-09 crisis, when myriad varieties of shadow banking collapsed in a heap, spreading panic and distress through the world economy.

政策制定者明白这一点。即便如此，他们可能很容易发现自己陷入一场追赶游戏，制定一套又一套需要广泛征求意见的新规则，以求赶上一个又一个充满想象力的金融创新。这是一场他们注定会输的游戏。他们不能静待新一代影子银行已变得具有系统重要性。但他们也不能对每一种刚刚冒头的风险都采取先发制人的行动。掐灭所有形态的市场主导型金融，将导致金融抑制和僵化。政策制定者将需要具备判断力和灵活性。

Policy makers understand this. Even so, they could easily find themselves in a game of catch-up, chasing one after another imaginative innovation with new rules requiring extensive consultation. This is a game they would be doomed to lose. They cannot afford to wait until it is obvious that a new incarnation of shadow banking has become systemically significant. But nor should they take pre-emptive action against every twitch of a risk. Choking off all forms of market-based finance is a recipe for financial repression and sclerosis. Judgment and flexibility will be needed.

如果监管当局想要应对这一挑战，就必须在制度和文化层面做出改变。

Institutional and cultural change will be needed if regulatory agencies are to rise to this challenge.

首先，监管当局需要确定的是，哪些市场对于实体经济或者金融体系本身格外重要。风险之一是念念不忘个别企业，而其实相关活动散布于数百乃至上千家中型企业时，有时也可能危及稳定。

First, the authorities need to establish which markets are especially important to the real economy, or to the financial system itself. There is risk in focusing on individual businesses, when activities spread across hundreds or even thousands of medium-sized companies can sometimes put stability in jeopardy.

需要考虑的重要问题是，如果一个重要市场停止运转，是否存在现成的替代市场？如果遭遇冲击，这个市场能否保持流动？这些问题假如在2007年以前就被提出，它们就会促使有关部门关注那些交易“资产支持证券”(ABS)的市场，以及通过抵押这类证券获取融资的市场——这些市场是推高杠杆水平的强大引擎。

It is important to ask whether there are ready substitutes if an important market closes; and whether the market in question would remain liquid in the event of a shock. If these questions had been asked before 2007, they would have focused attention on the markets in which asset-backed securities were traded, and in which money was borrowed against them – markets that were potent engines for leverage.

其次，证券监管当局需要拓宽他们的首要任务范围。在多数国家，证券监管当局拥有对资本市场、资产管理公司以及各种形态影子银行的管辖权。传统上，他们关注的是诚信和效率，而非系统稳定。近年来为遏制腐败丑闻重现而采取的举措不能放松。但证券监管者们应当将至关重要的反腐议程与加大对系统稳定的关注结合起来。需要补充他们的法定目标，明确授予他们维护系统稳定的职责。立法委员会和媒体应当向证券监管当局提出有关稳定风险的尖锐问题。

Second, securities regulators will need to broaden their priorities. In most countries, it is they who have jurisdiction over capital markets, asset managers and other manifestations of shadow banking. Historically they have focused on honesty and efficiency rather than systemic stability. There must be no let up in measures to deter a repeat of the wave of corruption scandals over recent years. But securities regulators need to combine their vital anti-corruption agenda with a greater focus on stability. Their statutory objectives need supplementing, to give them an explicit role in preserving stability. Legislative committees and the media should ask securities regulators searching questions about risks to stability.

第三点是，宏观审慎监管当局应被赋予足够的权力，以便采取先发制人的行动掐灭金融体系任何领域对稳定构成的威胁——不论是结构性的还是周期性的。他们必须被允许拥有一定程度的自由裁量权。很少有国家拥有切合需要的宏观审慎监管制度和机构。国际货币基金组织(IMF)在监督各个国家和地区时，应当带着警觉的眼光识别这些薄弱环节。

Third, macroprudential authorities need to be given the power to take action to forestall threats to stability – whether structural or cyclical – from anywhere in the financial system. They must be allowed some degree of discretion. Too few countries have macroprudential regimes and institutions that look fit for purpose. The International Monetary Fund should be vigilant in identifying such weaknesses in its surveillance of countries and regions.

监管当局需要相互配合，对具有系统重要性的市场采取一系列政策措施，涵盖基础设施、交易商圈子、信用评级机构的业务操作、发行上市管理当局等等。

Between them, the regulatory authorities need to pursue a range of policy measures for systemically relevant markets, covering infrastructure, the dealer community, credit rating agency practices, listing authorities and more.

其中一些举措已经准备就绪，但还需要做更多的工作。例如，负责审核每只公开发行证券的发行上市管理当局，应当从宏观审慎的视角来看待自身职责，这将使他们能为维护稳定做出更大贡献。当某种类型的证券发行过量导致市场脆弱时，他们应当大声疾呼。若非如此，当有突发事件导致市场承压时，市场活动将更有可能发生枯竭。

Some of that is in train. But more needs to be done. For example, the listing authorities – agencies that vet every publicly issued security – should take a macroprudential approach to their functions, enabling them to make a much bigger contribution to preserving stability. Where over-issuance of a particular type of security is rendering a market fragile, they should shout. Otherwise the market will be more likely to dry up when something happens that puts it under pressure.

最重要的是，为了维护金融系统稳定，需要建立货币市场的监管框架。货币市场是热钱流动的核心渠道；热钱能够抬高经济杠杆率，刺激冒险行为。

Most important, a framework for regulation of the money markets in the interests of stability is needed. They are the core channel through which hot money can fuel leverage and risk taking.

对银行重新收紧监管受到了欢迎，即使这并未让所有人满意。为保障金融系统作为一个整体的安全，我们需要为市场监管确立一个更加清晰的框架，使其联结起来构成一个连贯的整体，并基于应对真实世界脆弱性的明确经济和政策原则。若没有以上这些，也不赋予宏观审慎机构一定的自由裁量权，监管套利迟早会葬送过去几年的工作成果。

The re-regulation of banks has been welcome, even if it has not satisfied everyone. To ensure the safety of the financial system as a whole, we need a clearer framework for the regulation of markets, articulated as a coherent whole and based on clear economic and policy principles addressed to real-world vulnerabilities. Without that, and without giving macroprudential agencies some discretion, regulatory arbitrage will sooner or later undo the good work of the past few years.