Europe’s economic situation is viewed with far less concern than was the case six, 12 or 18 months ago. Policy makers in Europe far prefer engaging the United States on a possible trade and investment agreement to more discussion on financial stability and growth. However, misplaced confidence can be dangerous if it reduces pressure for necessary policy adjustments. 与6个月、12个月或18个月前相比，欧洲的经济形势远不是那么让人担心了。欧洲的政策制定者现在肯定更愿意与美国就一项可能的贸易投资协定展开磋商，而不是进一步讨论金融稳定与增长。不过，如果这种不该有的信心降低了实施必要政策调整的压力，结果可能是危险的。

There is a striking difference between financial crises in memory and financial crises as they actually play out. In memory, they are a concatenation of disasters. But as they play out, the norm is moments of panic separated by lengthy stretches of apparent calm. It was eight months from the South Korean crisis to the Russian default of 1998, six months from Bear Stearns’ demise to Lehman Brothers’ fall, and there were several 30 per cent stock market rallies between 1929 and 1933. 人们记忆中的金融危机与现实中上演的金融危机有着显著区别。人们记忆中的金融危机，就是连续爆发的一系列灾难。而现实中上演的金融危机，往往是在多个恐慌时刻之间穿插着漫长而明显的平静期。从韩国爆发金融危机到1998年俄罗斯出现债务违约，间隔了8个月时间；从贝尔斯登(Bear Stearns)垮台到雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)破产，间隔了6个月时间；此外，在1929年至1933年间，股市还曾数次反弹30%。

Is Europe out of the woods? Certainly a number of key credit spreads, particularly in Spain and Italy, have narrowed substantially. But it is far from clear that market conditions have improved. Investors are still limite. Restrictions limit the ability of pessimistic investors to short European debt. Regulations enable local banks to treat government debt as risk free. This allows them to access funding from the European Central Bank on non-market terms. And there is the suspicion that in extremis the central bank would come in strongly and bailout bond holders. Remissions are sometimes followed by cures and sometimes by relapses. 欧洲现在是否已经脱离险境？当然，多个关键的信贷息差（尤其是西班牙和意大利的信贷息差）已大幅收窄。但说到市场状况是否有所改善，这件事还远没有那么明朗。投资者依然寥寥无几。限制性规定抑制了悲观投资者做空欧洲债务的能力。监管规定使得各地的银行能把政府债务当作无风险资产。这让它们能够以非市场化的条款获得欧洲央行(ECB)的资金。有人怀疑，在紧急关头，欧洲央行会强力介入、纾困债券持有者。债务减免有时能解决问题，有时结果只是故态复萌。

A worrisome indicator in much of Europe is the tendency of stock and bond prices to move together. In healthy countries, when sentiment improves stock prices rise and bond prices fall, as risk premiums decline and interest rates rise. In unhealthy economies, as in much of Europe today, bonds are seen as risk assets, so they move just like stocks in response to changes in sentiment. 欧洲多国一个令人担心的迹象是，股票与债券价格有联动的趋势。在健康的经济体中，如果市场情绪好转，股价会上涨、债券价格会下跌，因为风险溢价下滑而利率会上升。在不健康的经济体（如当今许多欧洲国家）中，债券被当作风险资产；因此，当市场情绪发生变化时，债券价格就与股价同向变动。

Perhaps it should not be surprising that Europe still looks to be in serious trouble. Growth has been dismal, with eurozone gross domestic product still below its 2007 level. Forecasts call for little if any growth this year. 欧洲看起来仍处在重大困境之中，这一点或许不应该令人感到意外。其经济增长一直乏力，欧元区本地生产总值(GDP)仍低于2007年时的水平。预测显示，今年欧洲经济即便有增长，增幅也将极其有限。

For every Ireland, where there is a sense that a corner is being turned, there is a France, where the sustainability of current policy is increasingly questionable. 对每个像爱尔兰这样似乎形势有所好转的国家而言，都有一个像法国那样现行政策可持续性日益受质疑的国家与之对应。

The controversy surrounding the decision by European authorities to conduct a bail-in that imposes levies on Cypriot bank depositors gives an indication of the degree of fragility in Europe. The idea that converting a small portion of deposits into equity claims in an economy with a population barely over 1m could be a source of systemic risk suggests the current situation rests on a hair trigger. 欧洲当局决定展开内部纾困(bail-in)，向塞浦路斯银行储户征税。这一决定引发的争议突显出欧洲经济何其脆弱。已经有人认为，在一个人口刚过百万的经济体中，将存款的一小部分转化为股权，或会引发系统性风险。这一观点表明，现在的紧张局势到了一触即发的地步。

All of this is compounded by political uncertainty. Italy’s election was inconclusive even by its own standards. Scandals and staggeringly high unemployment are taking their toll in Spain. France is much calmer about its situation than are many outside observers. And Germany’s primary concern is avoiding turmoil before federal elections in September. There is little doubt that, given a choice, all eurozone countries would prefer almost any kind of macroeconomic unorthodoxy to the breakdown of monetary union. But this is insufficient. There is the serious risk that as nations pursue parochial concerns, the political and economic situation will deteriorate to a point that is not remediable. 政治不确定性令这一切雪上加霜。即便按意大利自己的标准，其最近的大选结果也可谓一团乱麻。丑闻和高得吓人的失业率给西班牙造成很大拖累。法国不认为自己的形势有多么令人不安，但外界观察人士的看法却与此迥异。德国的首要问题是在9月份的联邦选举前避免出现混乱。无疑，如果有选择，欧元区国家宁愿采取几乎任何非正统宏观经济措施，也不愿让货币联盟瓦解。但这还不够。它们面临的重大风险是，随着各国纷纷寻求解决各自的问题，欧元区的政治经济局势将持续恶化、直至无可救药。

Structural reform in the most troubled economies is essential, and the work of building a stronger institutional foundation for monetary union must go on. But the key to success will be the recognition that in economic policy – as in life – what is good for one is not good for all. 处境最艰难的经济体必须实施结构改革，为货币联盟构建更强健制度基础的工作必须开展下去。但成功的关键是要认识到，在经济政策领域（正如在人生中一样），对某个个体有益的政策未必有益于全体。

It is true, as German policy makers constantly point out, that fiscal consolidation and structural reform were key to Germany’s rise from being the “sick man of Europe” to its current position of strength. What they do not recognise is that there cannot be exports without imports. Germany’s export growth and huge trade surplus were enabled by borrowing by the European periphery. If the debtor countries of Europe are to follow Germany’s path without economic implosion there must be a strategy that assures increased external demand for what they produce. This could come from a German economy that was prepared to reduce its formidable trade surplus, from easier monetary policies in Europe that spurred growth and competitiveness, or from increased deployment of central funds such as those of the European Investment Bank. 确实，正如德国政策制定者不断指出的那样，财政整固与结构改革是德国从“欧洲病夫”崛起为当今强国的关键。但他们没有认识到的是，没有进口，就不会有出口。正是因为有了欧洲外围国家的借贷，才有了德国的出口增长与巨额贸易顺差。如果欧洲债务国效仿德国的模式而不引发任何经济崩溃，就必须有一项战略来保证这些国家所生产产品的外部需求不断增长。这可能来自于准备降低庞大贸易顺差的德国经济，来自于欧洲更加宽松的货币政策（可提振增长和竞争力），或者来自于越来越多的中央基金得到部署（如欧洲投资银行(EIB)旗下的基金）。

Invocation of necessity is not a strategy. As any student of Germany’s experience of the 1920s knows, requiring a nation to service large debts by being austere in a context where there is no growth in demand for its exports is far from being a viable strategy. 一味强调必要性算不上是一项战略。任何学过德国1920年代历史的人都知道，在一国出口产品需求不增长的背景下要求该国通过财政紧缩来偿还巨额债务，绝非什么可行的战略。

European policy makers, the International Monetary Fund and external policy makers with a stake in the European outcome need to recognise that the history of financial crises is a history of missed opportunities. New business is always more exciting than unfinished business. And where matters are controversial, forced moves are easier for policy makers than unforced moves because they can be portrayed as moves of necessity rather than choice. So outsiders avoid confrontation and insiders embrace drift. The consequences could be grave. 欧洲政策制定者、国际货币基金组织(IMF)以及与欧洲局势发展结果利益相关的外部政策制定者必须认识到，金融危机的历史是一部错失机遇的历史。新事业总比未竟的事业更令人兴奋。重要的是，对政策制定者而言，充满争议而被迫采取的举措比非受迫性举措更容易出台，因为前者可被描述成必要之举、而非可选的举措。如此一来，外部人士就不会提出质疑，内部人士也会听任局势发展。其后果可能极其严重。