| “A far-off country of which we know little” was Neville Chamberlain’s argument for doing nothing about Hitler’s 1938 annexation of Czechoslovakia. That annexation – carried out by a revanchist Nazi regime, allegedly in defence of ethnic Germans, is an unnerving parallel to Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Crimea. Russia’s president is using ethnic Russians as an excuse to restore Moscow’s old empire. Viktor Yanukovich, the ousted president of Ukraine, has even said: “I would like to ask those who cover for these dark forces in the west: are you blind? Have you forgotten what fascism is?” I really do hope not. |
| 1938年希特勒(Hitler)吞并捷克斯洛伐克时,时任英国首相的内维尔•张伯伦(Neville Chamberlain)决定不采取任何行动,声称捷克斯洛伐克是“一个我们所知甚少的遥远国度”。意在“收复失地”和复仇的纳粹政权以保卫德裔少数民族为由,吞并了捷克斯洛伐克,此举与弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)吞并克里米亚有着令人不安的相似之处。俄罗斯总统正以保护俄罗斯族为名,行恢复俄罗斯帝国之实。被赶下台的乌克兰总统维克托•亚努科维奇(Viktor Yanukovich)甚至表示:“我想问问西方那些庇护黑暗势力的人们:你们瞎了吗?你们忘记什么是法西斯主义了吗?”我真的希望我们没有忘记。 |
| The west is not going to war with a nuclear-armed Russia. But outright annexation of a part of a smaller country strikes at the roots of the post-second world war European settlement. Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor, was right to say that Russia had resorted to the “law of the jungle”. This annexation cannot go unanswered. It is too dangerous a precedent. |
| 西方不会与拥有核武器的俄罗斯开战。但悍然吞并较小国家的部分领土,是对欧洲在二战后建立的秩序的严重破坏。德国总理安格拉•默克尔(Angela Merkel)说的没错:俄罗斯已付诸于“丛林法则”。我们不能对这起吞并事件坐视不理。让这件事成为一个先例太危险了。 |
| Some argue that the west has already created the precedent by separating Kosovo from Serbia. But that was a response to Serbia’s brutality. Nothing like that had happened in Crimea. Nor did any western power annex Kosovo. A far better parallel is between Serbia’s actions in Kosovo and Russia’s forgotten brutality in Chechnya. |
| 一些人辩称,西方让科索沃从塞尔维亚独立出去,已经制造了先例。但那是对塞尔维亚野蛮行为的回应。克里米亚没有发生那样的事情。此外,也没有任何西方大国吞并科索沃。将塞尔维亚在科索沃的所作所为与已被世人遗忘的俄罗斯在车臣的野蛮行为相提并论,可能更为贴切。 |
| Russia complains that extension of Nato to its borders is an outrage. But Nato does not annex countries. Russia’s behaviour stoked the desire of its erstwhile possessions to join Nato. Why, Russians might now ask themselves, do people who have enjoyed the blessings of their rule wish to be defended against them? |
| 俄罗斯抱怨称,北约(Nato)扩张至俄罗斯边境令其忍无可忍。但北约并不吞并任何国家。而俄罗斯的行为促使其昔日的附庸国渴望加入北约。现在俄罗斯人或许应该问问自己:过去沐浴在他们领导之下的人民,为何现在要针对他们加强国防? |
| Mr Putin’s restored Russian autocracy is a revanchist power. This is depressing. But it is reality. The west must unite in response. |
| 普京让俄罗斯恢复了威权统治,这是一个意在“收复失地”和复仇的政权。这一点令人沮丧,但现实如此。西方必须团结起来做出回应。 |
| The essential points about western relations with Russia today are that the latter is relatively less powerful and relatively more economically intertwined than the old Soviet Union. This gives Russia weapons against us, but creates vulnerability. |
| 如今西方与俄罗斯关系的根本要点是,与当年的苏联相比,现在的俄罗斯实力相对较弱,与西方的经贸往来相对更为密切。这给了俄罗斯对付我们的武器,但也给俄罗斯带来脆弱环节。 |
| So how should relations be managed? With carrots and sticks. |
| 那么,应该如何管理西方与俄罗斯的关系?答案是胡萝卜加大棒。 |
| Start with Ukraine. The country rid itself of a predatory gangster. The west should not accept the lie that “fascists” drove this. But the west should state that if Russia does not threaten the integrity of the country, it will not offer Ukraine a defensive alliance. The priority must be Ukraine’s economic stabilisation. Whether Russia views that as in its own interests depends on whether it can be brought to view a stable, prosperous and democratic Ukraine as desirable or as a threat. |
| 先从乌克兰说起。这个国家赶走了一个掠夺成性的强盗总统。西方不应接受“法西斯分子”造成这种局面的谎言。但西方应当宣示,如果俄罗斯不去威胁乌克兰的领土完整,西方就不会提出与乌克兰结成防务同盟。首要事项必须是实现乌克兰的经济稳定。至于俄罗斯是否认为这符合它的利益,取决于在俄罗斯看来,一个稳定、繁荣和民主的乌克兰是可取的,还是一个威胁? |
| Oleksandr Turchynov, Ukraine’s acting president, has said: “What the Kremlin is most afraid of is a democratic, European, successful and prosperous Ukraine which we are today building . . . this is the real motive for their aggression.” |
| 乌克兰代总统亚历山大•图尔奇诺夫(Oleksandr Turchynov)表示:“克里姆林宫最担心的是乌克兰成为一个民主的、成功而繁荣的欧洲国家,而这正是我们现在努力打造的……这也是他们采取敌意行动的真正动机。” |
| I fear Mr Turchynov is right. Yet it would be vastly easier to stabilise Ukraine economically with Russian co-operation than without it: in the 12 months to October 2013, 24 per cent of Ukraine’s exports went to Russia and 30 per cent of its imports came from it. Russia is also the country’s biggest energy supplier. |
| 图尔奇诺夫说的话恐怕是对的。然而,若有俄罗斯的合作,乌克兰实现经济稳定就会容易得多:在截止2013年10月的12个月里,乌克兰对俄罗斯的出口占其总出口的24%,同时该国30%的进口来自俄罗斯。俄罗斯还是乌克兰最大的能源供应国。 |
| The International Monetary Fund is optimistic about the possibilities of agreeing a successful programme for Ukraine in April. Whatever Crimea’s political significance, it is only 4 per cent of the economy. The IMF has rightly worried about the overvaluation of the hryvnia, this being a way for the rich and powerful to obtain foreign assets at a subsidised rate. But that is now correcting, as it had to, given a current account deficit of 9 per cent of gross domestic product last year and the collapse in foreign currency reserves (see charts). Probably, the biggest issue is that any programme has to bind the next government. One with clear conditionality for tranched disbursements would be the best way to deliver this. |
| 国际货币基金组织(IMF)对今年4月就乌克兰援助项目成功达成一致的可能性感到乐观。无论克里米亚在政治上多么举足轻重,它在经济上只占乌克兰经济总量的4%。IMF正确地担心格里夫亚(乌克兰货币——译者注)被高估——富人和权贵们借此打折购买外国资产。但鉴于去年乌克兰经常账户赤字高达其国内生产总值(GDP)的9%以及外汇储备崩溃(见图表),格里夫亚汇率正出现大势所趋的纠正。最大的问题很可能是,任何项目都必须对下一届政府具有约束力。一个附带明确条件、分期分批支付到位的援助项目,将是做到这一点的最佳方式。 |
| It is essential to distinguish the urgent from the vital. Stabilising the economy and correcting huge price distortions – including unaffordable low gas prices from which the corrupt benefit vastly more than the poor – is urgent. Deep institutional reform is vital. Ukraine has a third and possibly last chance (the previous ones being independence in 1991 and the Orange revolution in 1995) to achieve what Poland has done. It must move swiftly towards a more open and competitive economy and a more transparent and accountable government, as Anders Aslund of the Peterson Institute for International Economics argues. Signing the EU association agreement would help. Cleansing the Augean stable of corruption must be the condition for needed assistance. |
| 在这里,有必要在“紧急事项”和“至关重要的事项”之间作出区分。稳定经济和修正巨大的价格扭曲是紧急的,包括让乌克兰不堪重负的较低的天然气价格,腐败官员从中获得的益处远远超过穷人。推行深层次的制度改革则是至关重要的。乌克兰拥有第三个、也可能是最后一个机会(前两个机会分别是1991年独立和2005年橙色革命)来实现波兰所取得的成就。正如彼得森国际经济研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)的安德斯•阿斯伦德(Anders Aslund)所言,乌克兰必须迅速加大经济开放度和提高经济竞争力,并打造一个更透明、更接受问责的政府。签署欧盟联系国协定(EU association agreement)将有所帮助。清除腐败积弊必须是获得所需援助的条件。 |
| A successful Ukraine would be far and away the best riposte to Russian revanchism. I can see no logical reason why it should be infeasible. But I can see two contingent ones. |
| 一个成功的乌克兰无疑是对俄罗斯复仇主义的最佳还击。从逻辑上讲,我看不出它不可行的任何理由。但我可以预见到两种可能出现的情况。 |
| The first is that Russia will dedicate itself to destroying this opportunity by breaking Ukraine up or seeking to conquer it. The answer to that must be that Russia would become a pariah and not just in the west. Few indeed are the countries prepared to contemplate such actions with equaniminity. The desire to prevent a return to a world of military conquests is very powerful. |
| 第一个可能是,俄罗斯将致力于破坏这种机会,比如让乌克兰分裂,或者寻求征服乌克兰。对此,答案是让俄罗斯成为西方乃至整个国际社会眼中的贱民国家。确实很少有国家准备泰然接受此类行为。不让军事征服横行的世界死灰复燃——这种愿望的力量是非常强大的。 |
| The second is that the west and, above all, Europe will be too frightened in their dealings with Moscow. The principal – though not only – reason is that Russia is such an important supplier of energy. Gas is the crucial commodity because it is far less easily tradeable than oil and coal. In 2011 Russia supplied |
| 第二个可能是,西方(最重要的是欧洲)将在与莫斯科打交道时过于胆怯。主要原因(尽管不是唯一原因)是,俄罗斯是一个非常重要的能源供应国。天然气是关键的大宗商品,因为它的贸易便利程度远远不及石油和煤炭。2011年,欧盟进口的天然气30%来自俄罗斯。但如果人们考虑到欧洲自身的天然气产量,以及天然气在能源结构中的份额,那么俄罗斯供应的能源很可能不会远远超出欧盟能源需求总量的5%。欧盟在迫不得已的情况下能够放弃这些能源吗?答案必然是肯定的,尽管它或许不得不反思一些受欢迎的政策,比如关闭核电站,同时美国将不得不考虑对欧盟出口天然气。 |
| 30 per cent of the EU’s imports of natural gas. But if one allows for domestic gas production, and the share of gas in the energy mix, then Russia probably supplied little more than a 20th of the EU’s energy. Could the EU dispense with that if it had to do so? The answer has to be yes, though it might have to reconsider popular policies, such as closing down nuclear power, while the US would also have to consider gas exports to the EU. |
| 西方不能佯称,乌克兰是“一个我们所知甚少的遥远国度”。乌克兰的今天可能是欧盟的明天。即便从其自身利益来说,俄罗斯意在“收复失地”的复仇主义也必须被制止。一个稳定而民主的乌克兰不会损害俄罗斯真正的较长期利益。我们的出发点必须是帮助乌克兰,最好是取得俄罗斯的合作,但如果必要的话也可以不要它的合作。这并不容易,但它将是值得的。 |
| The west must not pretend that Ukraine is a far-off country of which it knows little. It could be Ukraine today and the EU itself tomorrow. Russia’s revanchism has to be stopped, even for Russia’s own sake. A stable and democratic Ukraine is not hostile to Russia’s true longer-term interests. The starting point has to be helping Ukraine, ideally with Russian co-operation, but without it if necessary. It will not be easy. But it will be worthwhile. |