It would be easy to dismiss China’s first downgrade by an international rating agency since 1999 as unjustified pessimism. At less than 20 per cent of national income, China’s official debt stock is tiny. Growth, albeit slowing, remains healthy. In any case, Beijing is not short of options to repay its debt, whether via its central bank’s printing press or by increasing taxes that are still low. 对于中国的信用评级自1999年以来首次遭到调降，人们很容易觉得不以为然，认为国际评级机构表现出没有道理的悲观。按照官方数据，中国的债务存量尚不到国民收入的20%，是很低的。经济增长虽然在放缓，但仍是健康的。无论如何，北京方面在偿还债务方面选择不少，无论是通过央行的印钞机，还是提高仍然较低的税率。

Yet the report that accompanies Fitch’s decision to lower Beijing’s rating from AA- to A+ is right to emphasise China’s rapid expansion of credit as a real threat to economic stability. There are two areas of immediate concern. First, the size of the debt mountain accumulated by local authorities. Second, the stability of China’s growing shadow banking sector. 然而，惠誉(Fitch)将中国长期本币信用评级从AA-下调至A+的决定所附的报告，强调中国信贷快速扩张是对经济稳定的切实威胁，这一点是正确的。目前有两个领域尤其令人关切：一是地方政府积累的债务大山的规模，二是中国不断壮大的影子银行业的稳定性。

China’s municipalities have been saddled with loans since 2009, when Beijing encouraged its provinces to go on an investment binge as part of a heroic stimulus package. Roughly a quarter of these projects generated no revenue. The debt stock for local governments, unconsolidated in the public debt figures, is more than Rmb10tn ($1.6tn), a fifth of national income. Much of it is in short-term bank debt, placed in special-purpose investment vehicles designed to circumvent a ban on borrowing. 自2009年以来，中国的地方政府背上了大量贷款。那一年，北京方面鼓励各地大举投资，作为一项果敢刺激方案的一部分。当时上马的项目中，有大约四分之一不产生任何财政收入。公共债务数字中没有合并的地方政府债务存量，超过10万亿元人民币（合1.6万亿美元），相当于国民收入的五分之一。这些债务中有相当大一部分是短期银行债务，由旨在规避借款禁令的地方政府融资平台借入。

So far, Beijing has dealt with this problem by demanding that state-owned banks roll over these debts. But this is only a palliative. The government’s push for municipalities to issue their own bonds is more promising, as it will encourage greater thrift and transparency. Yet, ultimately, Beijing will have to decide whether it intends to bail out its provinces, which would add to its own debt stock. 迄今，北京方面应对这个问题的办法是要求国有控股银行对这些债务展期。但这只是权宜之计。政府推动地方政府发行债券的前景更加光明，因为这将鼓励量入为出和提高透明度。然而，最终而言，中国的中央政府必须决定它是否有意纾困地方政府，此举将加大其自身的债务存量。

Just as worrying is the rise of China’s shadow banking, which is financing almost half of all new credit. True, the development of shadow banks is natural as a financial system becomes more sophisticated. Yet the products sold outside China’s formal lending sector are often murky. Too frequently, they are used to finance uncreditworthy projects, particularly in the property industry. The authorities are seeking to regulate the sector by demanding greater disclosure. Critics fear these steps will prove insufficient. 中国影子银行业的崛起同样令人担忧，该行业正为近一半新信贷提供资金。没错，随着金融体系走向成熟和复杂，影子银行的发展是自然的。然而，在中国的正规银行体系以外销售的产品往往是有问题的。它们往往被用于资助没有信用可靠性的项目，尤其是房地产行业的项目。官方正寻求监管该行业，要求加大披露。批评人士担心这些步骤到头来将证明是不到位的。

Beijing faces a dilemma: regulating fast-expanding credit flows is bound to constrain growth. But the alternative is much uglier. As the western experience of the past decade shows, economic development is real only when it is financially sustainable. Getting a grip on credit expansion should be a priority for China’s leadership. 北京面对一个两难：监管快速扩张的信贷流动，必然会制约经济增长。但如果在这方面无所作为，局面将更加糟糕。正如西方在过去10年的经历所显示的，只有在金融上可持续的经济发展才是真实的。管控信贷扩张应当是中国领导层的工作重点。