George W Bush’s response to unbiddable adversaries was to bomb them; and, if they did not listen, to bomb them again. Barack Obama has decided the US should talk to its enemies; and, if they do not listen, well, it should talk to them again.

对于不顺从的对手，小布什(George W  Bush)的对策是轰炸他们；如果他们不听话，就继续轰炸他们。巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)则认为，美国应当与敌人对话；如果他们不听话，就应当继续与他们对话。

Some will find these characterisations unfair. To a degree they would have a point. But only to a degree. If Mr Bush tested to destruction the notion that war-war was the way to set the world to rights, Mr Obama should have learnt that jaw-jaw has its own limitations. Albeit in very different ways, the two leaders have presided over a significant diminution of US power.

有人会觉得这样子形容他们不公正。这些说法有一定的道理，但并不全对。如果说小布什印证了“打来打去”并不能让世界更美好，那么奥巴马也应该认识到，“谈来谈去”也有其局限性。在两位领导人的主政下，美国的实力都显著减弱，虽然两人的做法截然不同。

It is much easier to side with Mr Obama’s faith in diplomacy. After the bloody havoc wreaked by the likes of Mr Bush’s sidekicks, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, the US badly needed a president ready to recognise the realities of a more multipolar world and to give diplomacy a go.

奥巴马相信外交手段是比较容易得到人们支持的。在小布什的副手们迪克•切尼(Dick Cheney)和唐纳德•拉姆斯菲尔德(Donald Rumsfeld)等人制造了巨大破坏之后，美国亟需一位充分认识世界多极化现实、愿意尝试外交手段的总统。

Afghanistan and Iraq stand as painful testimony to the damage that can be inflicted by wars of choice. These costly defeats have encouraged Americans to turn inwards and disclaim any responsibility to uphold a rules-based international order. The US may yet turn its back on the world, as it did during the 1920s and 1930s.

“可打可不打的战争”可能造成严重损失，阿富汗战争和伊拉克战争便是惨痛教训。代价高昂的失败促使美国人将目光移向国内，放弃维护国际秩序的责任——这种秩序建立在规则的基础之上。就像20世纪二三十年代那样，美国可能置世界于不顾。

On the other side of the Atlantic, Mr Bush’s wars reinforced Europeans in the naive conviction that conciliation and concession are always better than anything that would run a risk of conflict. This state of mind has its own echoes in the appeasement policies of the interwar years.

大西洋彼岸，小布什发起的战争巩固了欧洲人的天真想法：调解和让步总好于引起冲突。这种心态令人想起两次世界大战间隔期间的绥靖政策。

Syria and, more recently, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its efforts to turn the rest of Ukraine into a failed state, testify to what can happen when a US administration goes too far in prizing restraint over resolve.

先是叙利亚内战，后是俄罗斯兼并克里米亚，并试图将乌克兰其余部分变成失败的国家。这些事情表明，当美国政府过于重视忍让克制、拿不出行动决心时，会发生什么。

I have always thought talk of inexorable American decline to be vastly overdone. What is true is that Mr Obama’s foreign policy has seen global perceptions of waning US power running far ahead of economic and military realities.

我一直觉得，认为美国衰落不可阻挡的论调太过夸张。但有一点是真的：奥巴马的外交政策使得全球对美国衰落程度的认识，要远甚于美国经济和军事力量的实际衰落。

These perceptions matter. They shape the behaviour of others. I spent the early part of this week at the annual forum of South Korea’s Asan Institute in Seoul. This gathering of foreign-policy experts saw plenty of lively argument about who is to blame for an upsurge of nationalism and rising tensions in the East and South China Seas.

这些认识事关重大，会影响其他国家的行为。我近日参加了韩国首尔峨山研究院(Asan Institute)的年度论坛。与会的外交政策专家热烈争论的一个问题是：谁该为当前民族主义情绪高涨以及东中国海、南中国海紧张局势加剧负责？

On one thing they all agreed: Mr Obama, on a four-nation tour of the region, will struggle to revive Washington’s standing among its allies.

与会者均同意一点：正进行亚洲四国之行的奥巴马将难以重振美国在其盟国心中的地位。

Mr Putin’s march into Ukraine had two rationales. The first, a consequence of Moscow’s failure to coerce Kiev into a Eurasian union, was rooted in the 19th-century concept that Russian security depends on command of its near-abroad. The second was a calculation that European disunity and Mr Obama’s aversion to confrontation would blunt the international response.

普京(Vladimir Putin)出兵乌克兰，基于两点理由。第一点植根于19世纪的理念：俄罗斯的安全取决于对近邻的控制。出兵是俄政府未能将乌克兰强制纳入欧亚联盟的结果。第二，普京估计，欧洲的不团结和奥巴马回避对抗的态度将弱化国际反应。

No one should quarrel with the White House for sending John Kerry, the US secretary of state, for successive rounds of talks with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov. Diplomacy, though, does not work in a vacuum. What has been missing has been a persuasive signal of US readiness to impose serious costs on Moscow.

白宫派国务卿约翰•克里(John Kerry)与俄罗斯外长谢尔盖•拉夫罗夫(Sergei Lavrov)连续举行数轮谈判，这点无可厚非。不过，外交不可能凭空起作用。美国需要发出强有力的信号，表明它准备让俄罗斯政府付出巨大代价——这是美国一直所缺乏的。

I am not suggesting that the US and its European allies should be reaching for their guns. But Washington could have assembled (and should still do so) a much stronger set of economic measures, including financial sanctions, as a demonstration of its determination to defend basic international norms of behaviour.

我并不是主张美国及其欧洲盟友应该拿起枪。但美国政府本可以（现在仍然应该这么做）推动一系列更为强有力的经济举措，包括金融制裁，以展示其维护国际行为基本准则的决心。

Of course, some Europeans would grumble. My guess, though, is that many would secretly cheer a US plan that forced them to look seriously at their energy dependence on Moscow and to overrule the European businesses that insist international law comes second to corporate profits. The alternative, after all, is for Europe to abandon all pretensions of co-operative internationalism and embrace a return to the days when the continent’s borders depended on the balance of force.

当然，一些欧洲人会抱怨。但我猜，很多人会为美国拿出这样一项计划而暗自庆幸：这项计划迫使欧洲国家严肃看待它们对俄罗斯的能源依赖，并向那些把公司利益置于国际法之上的欧洲企业施压。毕竟，对于欧洲而言，另一种选择是放弃所有关于国际合作精神的主张，回到依靠力量强弱决定国境分界线的日子。

Mr Obama and his fellow Nato leaders are due this summer to map out a new course, following the alliance’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. Some think that Mr Putin has done the job for them. The organisation, they suggest, can pick up where it left off and revert to its old role as the guardian of Europe’s defence.

在北约撤出阿富汗后，奥巴马和北约(Nato)其他领导人将在今年夏季制定一条新的路线。一些人认为，普京帮他们做好了这件事情。他们表示，北约可以重新开始，再次担当起作为欧洲防御守卫者的角色。

The truth is that governments have a much bigger task. Dispatching a few more troops to Poland and the Baltics will be pointless if the alliance does not remake the political case for collective defence. Nato’s mission is to avoid wars by serving as a credible deterrent. But the deterrence will be credible only if governments restore its legitimacy in the eyes of voters who have grown deeply cynical about the efficacy of defence spending.

事实是各国政府肩负着更重大的任务。如果北约没有重新为共同防御提出政治理由的话，那么向波兰和巴尔干半岛派出更多军队将是毫无意义的。北约的使命是通过作为一种可信的威慑力量来避免战争爆发。但只有在各国政府恢复北约在选民心目中合法性的情况下，这种威慑才会可信，而选民已开始对国防开支的效果表示严重怀疑。

Ukraine should have been a wake-up call for Europeans about the returning threat to the security and freedom they have come to take for granted. The opinion polls suggest it has been otherwise.

乌克兰事件本应给欧洲人敲响警钟，他们已经习以为常的安全和自由又面临威胁。民调显示，欧洲人并没有意识到这点。

War – cold or hot – against Russia is not an answer. Nor, though, is an assumption that jaw-jaw can do the job. A tough rejoinder to Mr Putin should sit alongside an approach that offers genuine partnership to a Russia that plays by the rules. Much depends on Mr Obama.

与俄罗斯不管冷战还是热战都不是良策。认为对话就能解决问题的想法也不可行。在强硬回应普京的同时，还应表明一种态度：如果俄罗斯按规则行事，彼此就能建立真正的伙伴关系。这在很大程度上取决于奥巴马。

I heard many times in Seoul that east Asia needs a strong US. So, though it hates to admit it, does Europe.

在首尔，我听到很多有关东亚需要一个强大美国的说法。欧洲也需要，不过欧洲不愿承认这点。