Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister, continues to astonish. He could hardly have chosen a more radical team than the one he has appointed to run the Bank of Japan. Haruhiko Kuroda, a critic of the BoJ’s past passivity, is now in charge of monetary policy.

日本首相安倍晋三(Shinzo Abe)继续其惊人表现。他任命了一个激进得不能再激进的日本央行(BoJ)团队。曾经批评日本央行被动无为的黑田东彦(Haruhiko Kuroda)，现在负责日本的货币政策。

Make no mistake. Mr Kuroda not only wants to deliver 2 per cent annual inflation, but considers this to be within the power of the central bank. He can also expect to have the backing of the government and the new deputy governors, Kikuo Iwata and Hiroshi Nakaso. The BoJ may grumble. But a shift in policy seems sure. The question is: will it work? Indeed, what might “work” mean?

别搞错。黑田东彦不仅希望实现2%的年度通胀目标，而且还认为这是央行力所能及的事。他还能获得政府和两位新任副行长岩田规久男(Kikuo Iwata)和中曾宏(Hiroshi Nakaso)的支持。日本央行的官员阶层可能会抱怨。但政策转变似乎确定无疑。问题在于：它会奏效吗？的确，“奏效”意味着什么？

One must start by noting Japan’s peculiar position. Expectations of deflation are well entrenched, in bond markets, if not in surveys, with yields on government 10-year bonds now at 66 basis points (see chart). Real rates of interest have remained positive, even at the short end. Deflation has also been very sticky. Finally, the distribution of debt has shifted from the private to the public sectors: according to economic advisers Smithers and Co net debt of non-financial companies has fallen from 150 per cent of equity in 1995 to 30 per cent. But government net debt has jumped from 29 per cent of gross domestic product at the end of 1996 to 135 per cent at the end of 2012.

首先必须注意日本独特的处境。在债券市场，通缩预期根深蒂固（即使这不是调查所显示的），日本10年期国债收益率目前为66个基点（见图表）。实际利率依然为正，即便短期债券也是这样。通缩还非常顽固。最后，债务分布已从私人部门转向公共部门：经济顾问公司Smithers and Co的数据显示，非金融企业的净债务/股本比率已从1995年的150%降至30%。但政府净债务与国内生产总值(GDP)的比率已从1996年底的29%，飙升至2012年底的135%。

These facts have deep implications. First, ending deflation is going to be far harder than it would have been in the late 1990s. Second, it would be helpful if higher inflation also made real interest rates negative, which would encourage people to spend. Third, negative real rates would also redistribute wealth from the state’s creditors towards future taxpayers.

这些事实具有深层次的影响。首先，结束通缩将比上世纪90年代末期困难得多。其次，如果高通胀也使得实际利率为负，鼓励人们消费，那将是有益的。第三，负实际利率还会重新分配财富，使其从政府的债权人流向未来的纳税人。

Such negative real rates can be achieved either by making inflation higher than expected or by capping interest rates. It is not, in fact, clear whether the Japanese authorities want to create strongly negative real rates of interest. But they should, even though this would also create the risk of a political backlash.

要达到这种负的实际利率，要么可以让通胀超过预期，要么可以制定利率上限。实际上，尚不清楚日本官方是否希望出现明显的负实际利率。但他们应该这么希望，即便这也会带来政治反弹的风险。

How should this be done and how transparently? The BoJ could insist that it is aiming at 2 per cent inflation, but follow policies likely to bring higher inflation than this. That would be risky deceit. Alternatively, it could announce the aim of higher inflation, while announcing a lengthy period of low nominal interest rates. This would be an open inflation tax.

如何达到明显的负实际利率？采用的手段需要有多大的透明度？日本央行可以坚称它力求达到2%的通胀目标，但实际上采取很可能让通胀水平高于该目标的政策。那将是高风险的欺骗。或者，它可以宣布更高的通胀目标，同时宣布一段漫长的低名义利率时期。这将是一种不加掩饰的通胀税。

Either way, policy could be buttressed by a temporary move to a target for price or nominal GDP levels. The argument for this is that bygones should not, in this extreme case, be bygones. The current price level is 30 per cent below where it would have been if annual inflation had been 2 per cent since 1997.

无论采取哪种方式，政策都可以得到临时采用的价格水平或名义GDP目标的支持。理由是，在这种极端情况下，过去的不应该让它过去。如果自1997年以来每年通胀率为2%，那么价格水平将会比现在高30%。

Similarly, nominal GDP is 40 per cent lower than it would have been if it had grown at 3 per cent a year. If the BoJ sought to return to the level of nominal GDP implied by 3 per cent annual growth from 1997, it would be committing itself to an annual increase of close to 9 per cent a year over the next decade. That could surely reduce the real burden of debt! Thereafter, policy makers might return to a 2 per cent inflation target. (See charts.) This is illustrative, not a recommendation. But the case for such a degree of radicalism is that it could change economic prospects quickly. Normal targets may not be enough.

同样，如果年增长率为3%，那么名义GDP将会比现在高40%。如果日本央行想要让名义GDP达到自1997年起每年3%增长率所隐含的水平，它就得在未来10年让年增长率达到近9%的水平。这肯定会降低实际债务负担！此后，政策制定者可能恢复2%的通胀目标（见图表）。这只是举例说明，而非建议。但是支持如此激进的政策的理由是，它可能让经济前景迅速改观。正常的目标可能是不够的。

It is not just a matter of new targets. Policy instruments also matter. The new heads of the BoJ must consider a wider menu of asset purchases, including monetisation of government deficits. Richard Werner of Southampton University has long argued that fiscal monetisation would best come from direct borrowing by the government from banks. At the limit, Japan might use “helicopter money”, as discussed in my column of February 12. If the BoJ uses fiat money it does not wish to withdraw, it will also have to impose explicit reserve requirements on commercial banks.

这不仅是新目标的问题。政策工具也很重要。日本央行新领导层必须考虑更广泛的资产购买菜单，包括政府赤字货币化。南安普顿大学(Southampton University)的理查德•沃纳(Richard Werner)长期主张，要想实现财政货币化，最好是由政府直接向银行借款。在极端情况下，就像我在2月12日的专栏里所讨论的，日本可以“从直升机上撒钱”。如果日本央行使用了它不希望收回的法定货币，它也必须对商业银行出台明确的存款准备金规定。

The traditional view at the BoJ has been that monetary policy cannot raise inflation. This shows a surprising lack of imagination. In principle, the BoJ can use its fiat money to buy everything in the world, at any price it wanted. This would certainly lower the purchasing power of the yen. It is not a question of whether inflation can be achieved, but whether that achievement can be managed, particularly when one is trying to shift strong expectations of sticky deflation. The risk, rather, is that it would be like pulling a brick with a piece of elastic, instead: little movement at first, and then too much. This is why the target matters: the policy shift must be both credible and credibly contained.

日本央行的传统观点是，货币政策不能让通胀上升。这显示出该机构的想象力惊人地匮乏。原则上，日本央行可以用其法定货币，以其想要的任意价格购买世界上任何东西。这必定会降低日元的购买力。问题不是能否实现通胀目标，而是这种实现能否保持在可控范围内，尤其是在试图改变人们对于顽固通缩的强大预期的时候。风险在于，它就像用一根橡皮筋拉一块砖头：最初拉不动，接着又移动幅度过大。这就是为什么目标很重要：政策转变必须可信，而且可信地保持在可控范围内。

One can envisage two big and clearly interrelated dangers. First, the new approach might be seen as a deliberate attempt at beggar-my-neighbour policies and would, as a result, cause dangerous retaliation. Second, it might stimulate flight from the holders of yen and so a currency collapse and soaring inflation. The first is a more immediate danger and the second a more remote one. Both show that the policy shift needs to be anchored with a credible exit to normality.

人们可以想像两大明显关联的危险。首先，这种新方法可能被看作是日本故意实施以邻为壑的政策，因此将招致危险的报复措施。第二，它会刺激日元持有者逃离，从而导致汇率崩溃和通胀飙升。第一个危险较为紧迫，第二个则有些遥远。二者都表明，政策转变需要锚定在一个可信的退出（回归常态）战略上。

Finally, then, is a radical change in monetary policy enough? The answer is: no. In the short run, the government can and should monetise its deficits. In the long run, however, it will need to rebalance the economy away from dependence on government-created demand.

最后，大举改变货币政策就够了吗？答案是：不够。在短期内，日本政府可以（而且应该）货币化其赤字。然而，从长期来看，它将需要推动经济再平衡，使其减轻依赖政府创造的需求。

As I argued on February 5, the government must ultimately reduce its structural fiscal deficit. If it is to do this, the Japanese private sector must reduce its counterpart structural financial surpluses. Thus, in the long run, the excess of retained earnings over investment in the Japanese corporate sector must shrink. A permanent increase in the current account surplus, which is the alternative, must not now be adopted by the world’s third-largest economy: it would destabilise a global economy suffering from a savings glut.

正如我在2月5日所主张的，日本政府最终必须削减其结构性财政赤字。要做到这一点，日本私人部门必须削减对应的结构性财政盈余。因此，长期而言，日本企业在投资后的过剩留存利润必须缩减。全球第三大经济体不能采取另一种方法，即永久增加经常账户盈余，因为那会扰乱正遭受储蓄过剩困扰的全球经济。

Japan is trying to fly a monetary kite long stuck on the ground. Some will argue that the independence of the central bank has been violated. The response to that is that the BoJ had failed to deliver on its price stability mandate. The question is rather whether the new team can raise inflation and lower real interest rates without destabilising domestic or global economies. Maybe, working to a 2 per cent inflation target will deliver what is needed. But I suspect that a more radical target, for levels of prices or nominal GDP, may be needed, at least for a while. The new team at the BoJ will have to avoid doing too little, even though it risks ending up doing too much. It will need much judgment and some luck. The world should wish it well.

日本正试图放飞长期困在地上的“货币风筝”。有些人将提出央行的独立性受到了侵犯。对此的回应是，日本央行未能履行其价格稳定使命。真正的问题在于，日本央行的新团队能否在不扰乱国内或全球经济的情况下，提高通胀并降低实际利率。或许，向2%的通胀目标努力就能如愿以偿。但我怀疑，可能需要制定更激进的价格水平或名义GDP目标，至少在一段时期内是这样。日本央行的新团队必须避免做得太少，即使它有可能最终会做得太多。它将需要大量正确判断和一些运气。世界应该祝日本央行好运。